In the postprocessing of quantum key distribution, the raw key bits from the mismatched-basis measurements, where two parties use different bases, are normally discarded. Here, we propose a postprocessing method that exploits measurement statistics from mismatched-basis cases, and prove that incorporating these statistics enables uncharacterized qubit sources to be used in the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol and the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, a case which is otherwise impossible.
I. INTRODUCTION
are able to characterize their encoding systems [37, 38] . Recently, by modifying the original MDIQKD and assuming qubit sources, we have proved that even when the encoding systems are totally unknown, MDIQKD can still be secure [40] . In this modified MDIQKD scheme which we call qubit-MDIQKD [40] , the MU must be able to distinguish two Bell states, while the original MDIQKD protocol identifies only one Bell state.
In this paper, we propose a modification to the original MDIQKD protocol. Unlike qubit-MDIQKD, our new scheme only needs to identify one Bell state, while still allowing uncharacterized qubit encoding systems, thanks to the incorporation of the mismatched-basis statistics. Here, we prove the security of this new scheme and show that it outperforms the qubit-MDIQKD scheme. Our main proof here is for the new MDIQKD scheme and we can specialize it to work on BB84 as well. The idea is to regard the MU and Bob in qubit-MDIQKD as Bob in BB84. Thus, with one proof, we cover the security of both MDIQKD and BB84 using uncharacterized qubit sources. In BB84, our proof also allows uncharacterized qubit von Neumann measurements to be used.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we present the details of the proposed MDIQKD scheme and the main result of our security proof. The details of our security proof are given in the appendix. We adapt our analysis to BB84 in Sec. III. In Sec. IV, we give a numerical simulation on the proposed scheme, which is also compared to the original MDIQKD scheme and the qubit-MDIQKD scheme of Ref. [40] . We also show the performance of BB84 with mismatched-basis statistics (our new scheme) and compare it with the original BB84. Finally, we conclude in Sec. V.
II. MDIQKD PROTOCOL WITH MISMATCHED-BASIS STATISTICS AND MAIN RESULT
The protocol setting for MDIQKD with uncharacterized qubit sources is as follows. Alice and Bob send their encoded qubits to Eve for BSM, as shown in Fig. 1 . When Alice (Bob) selects to output a state with index x (y), her (his) encoding device emits a mixed qubit state ρ A,x (ρ B,y ) to Eve. Alice and Bob do not know what these states are. For simplicity, we assume that the states are pure states ρ A,x = |ϕ x ϕ x | and ρ B,y = ϕ ′ y ϕ ′ y . This is without loss of generality, and the mixed-state case automatically holds by using the same argument as in our qubit-MDIQKD analysis [40] . We assume that the initial joint state with Eve's system is ρ A,x ⊗ ρ B,y ⊗ ρ E for all x, y where Eve's state ρ E is independent of x and y. The MU performs a BSM on the incoming states and announces whether the projection is successful to Alice and Bob. The MU is required only to identity one Bell state (same as the original MDIQKD and unlike qubit-MDIQKD [40] ).
FIG. 1.
A schematic diagram for the MDIQKD protocol. BSM: Bell-state measurement, which is an untrusted device and may be controlled by Eve; |ϕ0 , |ϕ1 , |ϕ2 , |ϕ3 (|ϕ We plan to analyze its security with the entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) method [5, 6] , which is widely used for security proofs of QKD. The essence of this method is to convert our protocol into an equivalent EDP, and obtain the relation between the phase error rate and the bit error rate, which can be estimated in experiments. We give the equivalent EDP version of our protocol as follows.
1. Alice and Bob prepare N pairs of entangled states,
respectively. The subscripts A and B denote Alice's and Bob's classical raw key bits, respectively, of which values 0 and 1 represent encodings in basis 0, and values 2 and 3 represent encodings in basis 1. The states, |ϕ x C and |ϕ ′ x D (x = 0, 1, 2, 3), are Alice's and Bob's uncharacterized encoding qubits, respectively, to be sent to the MU. Alice and Bob are only aware that |ϕ x C and |ϕ ′ x D are 2-dimensional state but do not know the details, since they do not trust the accuracies of their encoding systems. Here, we describe Alice's and Bob's encoding systems in an equivalent measurement-based way. By measuring her half of the system, Alice collapses the system C to one of |ϕ i C with i = 0, 1, 2, 3 with equal probabilities, which is equivalent to saying that Alice prepares the system C in one of the four states with equal probabilities. The same argument holds for Bob. Hence, Eq. (1) shows a mathematical equivalent description of Alice's and Bob's encoding systems.
2. Alice and Bob send the states, labeled by C and D respectively, to Eve who announces her BSM result. There are two possible outcomes: BSM failure, or a successful measurement result in the Bell states
For the first outcome Eve announces message z = 0 to Alice and Bob, while message z = 1 is announced for the second outcome. One must note that Eve might not honestly announce her measurement results, or even does not perform the above mentioned BSM. However, Eve must announce a message z = 0 or z = 1 to Alice and Bob for each trial.
3. After receiving Eve's message, Alice and Bob perform bit sift: discarding bits when Eve announces failed BSM (z = 0). Then, they project systems A and B in Eq. (1) onto |0 0| + |1 1|, |2 2| + |3 3|, which correspond to basis 0 and basis 1, respectively. Then they perform basis sift: when their systems collapse onto the same bases, by sacrificing certain bits for error testing 1 , they can deduce a conditional probability distribution p(z|x, y), where z = 0, 1 stands for Eve's announcements, failure or Eq. (2), respectively; x and y (x, y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}) represent the states of systems A and B. When their systems collapse onto different bases, they will deduce a similar probability p(z|x, y), but the key bits are discarded.
4. Finally, Alice and Bob perform EDP on systems A and B and obtain maximally entangled Bell states |φ
where secure key bits can be extracted.
The conditional probabilities of the measurement result by a lossless MU are listed in Table I , from which one can see that there is a 75% intrinsic loss for the original MDIQKD scheme when only one Bell state can be distinguished. Before introducing our security proof, let us see why statistics of mismatched basis cases can be used to generate secure key bits with a simple example. In the original MDIQKD protocol, Alice and Bob extract a secure key from the first half (matched-basis case) of the results shown in Table I , and discard the second half (mismatched-basis case). Such postprocessing would fail when Alice and Bob do not trust the accuracy of their qubit encoding systems. Consider the case when |ϕ 0 = |ϕ 2 = |0 and |ϕ 1 = |ϕ 3 = |1 for both Alice and Bob. It is obvious that Alice and Bob may still observe probabilities p(z|x, y) with perfect correlations for the matched-basis case, but all key bits can be eavesdropped by Eve. On the other hand, the results from the mismatched-basis, the second half of Table I , can be used to exclude this attack, in which Alice and Bob would find perfect correlations instead of random results.
Main Result: In above protocol, if Alice and Bob observe the probabilities p(z|x, y), their final secret key bits in basis 0 is given by
is the Shannon's binary entropy function. The bit error rate in basis 0 is given by
and phase error rate is bounded by
The deviation ε is defined as
where the maximization takes over all non-negative real numbers C 30 , C 31 , C ′ 20 and C ′ 21 satisfying definite constraints to find the maximum value of function f (C, C ′ ),
where min{a, b} yields the smaller one of real numbers a and b. And constraints for searching the maximum value are
We can see that the cross-basis statistics restrict the variables C 30 , C 31 , C ′ 20 and C ′ 21 . Thus, the phase error rate is obtained by numerical optimization. The proof of this main result is detailed in appendix. Note that with the procedure introduced in the Sec. IV of Ref. [40] , our main result applies to case that Alice's and Bob's encoding states are two-dimensional mixed states, although the proof given in appendix is based on two-dimensional pure states.
Above results are general results for arbitrary observed probabilities p(z|x, y), but it seems a bit complicated. For ease of understanding, we simplify our results for typical MDIQKD implementations. Consider in a successful experiment for MDIQKD, one may observe that p(1|00) = p(1|11), p(1|01) = p(1|10) and p(1|3, 0) = p(1|3, 1) = p(1|0, 2) = p(1|1, 2) = (p(1|00) + p(1|01))/2. Under this case, we simplify the function f (C, C ′ ) and the constraints as
where e ′ b = p(1|3, 2)/(p(1|0, 0)+p(1|0, 1)), and max{a, b} yields the larger one of real numbers a and b. And constraints for searching maximum value are simplified as
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III. BB84 WITH UNCHARACTERIZED SOURCES AND MEASUREMENTS
Our MDIQKD security analysis can be directly applied to the BB84 protocol with the following conditions:
• Alice prepares one of four uncharacterized qubit states;
• Bob receives a qubit state from the channel;
• and Bob's measurement is one of two uncharacterized qubit von Neumann (projective) measurements corresponding to the two BB84 bases.
This means that the measurement for each basis is a projection onto two orthogonal states. Let Bob's qubit measurement for basis 0 be a projection onto {|φ ′ 0 , |φ ′ 1 } and for basis 1 be {|φ
The main idea is to merge the MU and Bob in the MDIQKD setting to become Bob in the BB84 setting (see Fig. 2 ). In the BB84 picture, Alice emits a qubit state which is processed by Eve and is received by Bob as ρ x . Bob chooses basis 0 or 1 with equal probabilities to measure it. The probability of obtaining M y = |φ 
The term p(1|x, y) corresponds to a hypothetical MDIQKD setting where the MU identifies |φ + and the last term corresponds to the BB84 setting. Thus, we can regard the BB84 setting where we drop half of the measurement outcomes as an MDIQKD setting where the measurement outcomes are kept when the MU gets |φ + . To make this equivalence rigorous, we also need the freedom to choose the distribution for selecting y in the MDIQKD setting to match the occurrences of y in the BB84 setting. We have this freedom in the MDIQKD setting because the phase error bound in our security proof is independent of this distribution. Since the MDIQKD situation is a restricted case of the general one considered in our proof (because we consider a specific MU that identifies |φ + honestly and Eve is allowed to intervene with Alice's state only), it is covered by our proof, which means that the equivalent BB84 setting where half of the outcomes are dropped is also covered by our proof. To get a relationship between bit and phase error rates for the actual BB84 protocol, we simply obtain the measurement probabilities tr(ρ x M y ) in the experiment and use them as p(1|x, y) in the formulas (4)- (7), since the factor of half will be canceled out anyway. Note that in the actual BB84 protocol, there is no need to drop half of the outcomes because both the dropped half and the retained half have the same statistics anyway. We could have kept the dropped half and would have obtained the exact same phase error bound. Thus, the two halves can be used together to generate a secret key.
IV. SIMULATION
We first consider the case that Alice and Bob use ideal BB84 senders (not trusted by Alice and Bob though) and an ideal Bell-state MU to perform our new protocol with noise-free channel and no Eve's attack, but with photon absorption taken into account. One must observe that e b = 0, p(1|3, 0) = p(1|3, 1) = p(1|0, 2) = p(1|1, 2) = p(1|0, 0)/2 = p(1|1, 1)/2, then with constraints (7), we deduce that
Then, through (6), it is easy to verify that ε = 0 and thus e p = 0. Hence, MDIQKD can be secure in this situation.
In general, an analytical expression for the key rate is hard to obtain when channel errors are presented. One can measure values of p(z|x, y) from experiments directly and obtain the key rate (such value needed in postprocessing) via numerical methods. For comparison, we assume the errors appeared in the state preparation and measurement are absorbed into the channel, which can be controlled by Eve. In the simulation, four single photon detectors (SPDs) FIG. 2 . The security proof of MDIQKD (left) can be applied to BB84 (right) when the MU is merged into Bob. We impose that the MU honestly announces the |φ + = (|00 + |11 )/ √ 2 outcome when it performs the BSM. The two von Neumann (projective) measurements of Bob on the right correspond to the two BB84 bases and each projects onto two orthogonal qubit states. The relationship between the states in MDIQKD and BB84 is that ϕ with the dark counting rate of d are used in the MU. Denote η as the total transmission efficiency of the channel from Alice (Bob) to the MU in the middle of channel and thus η is also the probability that a single photon from Alice or Bob can trigger a SPD of the MU.
Consequently, if Alice and Bob both emit qubit |0 or |1 , the MU will announce message 1 with probability
in which the first item corresponds to the case that the projection of the incoming photons into |φ + CD is successful: the two photons trigger the two SPDs and the remaining two SPDs do not give dark clicks. The second item accounts for the case that only one photon triggers one SPD but a dark count occurs in one relevant SPD, and the last item represents the case that two photons are absorbed by the channel but two dark counts occur in two relevant SPDs. And p(0|0, 0) = p(0|1, 1) = 1 − p(1|0, 0) also holds.
By the similar considerations, we set p(
, and p(0|1, 0) = p(0|0, 1) = 1 − p(1|1, 0), p(1|3, 0) = p(1|3, 1) and p(1|0, 2) = p(1|1, 2). Note that the formulas for the simulation are relevant to the existing literature (cf., Eq.(7) in [43] ). The secure-key rate (unit: per pulse under basis 0) versus total transmission loss of channel from Alice or Bob to the MU is given by Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 .
In Fig. 3 , the secure-key rate for original MDIQKD is given by the solid line, in which we assume that Alice and Bob are aware that their encoding states are perfect, MU can only distinguish Bell state |φ + CD , and Eve is passive. The secure-key rate for our protocol is given by the dashed line, in which we have ideal BB84 senders (but we do not trust them now), MU can distinguish one Bell states |φ + CD , and Eve is passive. In Fig. 4 , we consider that practical coherent sources are used by Alice and Bob, and infinite decoy states [44] [45] [46] are employed.
Additionally, a numerical simulation for BB84 with uncharacterized qubit sources and measurements is given in Fig. 5 . In this simulation, we use the same parameters as the simulation for MDIQKD.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose that the statistics for the bits from mismatched bases can relax the assumptions on the encoding devices in original MDIQKD and BB84 protocols. Our method does not need any modification of the original MDIQKD or BB84 protocol, except that Alice and Bob should obtain some statistics of bits from mismatched bases. Alice and Bob do not need to guarantee the accuracies of their encoding systems except that they need to be sure that the encoding states are two-dimensional. Note that our assumptions satisfy many practical MDIQKD and BB84 systems. For example, in phase encoding systems, it is reasonable to assume that encoding states are in two-dimensional space while the accuracies of the phase modulators may be questionable. The simulation results show that with decoy states, our scheme can distribute secure key bits over long distances (over 100km). Our main proof is for the MDIQKD protocol, but we show that it can be used for the BB84 protocol with uncharacterized sources and measurements by considering the MU to be part of Bob. We prove our main result here. Following a similar argument used in Ref. [6] , an EDP has been given in section II. Given that the initial states of Alice's, Bob's and Eve's ancillas are separable, we first define Eve's collective attack by a unitary transformation:
where x, y = {0, 1, 2, 3}, |e Ea is Eve's arbitrary ancilla, |0 M is the message which will be sent to Alice and Bob, and |Γ xy0 E and |Γ xy1 E are all normalized Eve's arbitrary quantum states for Eve's ancilla and photons C, D. Here, we emphasize that our collective attack modeled by Eq. (A1) has taken the basis-independent attack and basis-dependent attack [47] into account. The basis-independent attack is a situation where the density matrix of the states transmitted in the channel when Alice and Bob's bases choices are both 0 is the same as the case of basis 1. The basis-dependent attack is a situation where the two density matrices are different. The basis dependence can be measured by fidelity. In general, for basis-dependent attacks, Eve may obtain basis information through certain measurements and then adopt different operations accordingly. Any measurement that Eve may utilize to learn the basis and the followup operations can be seen as part of an extended unitary transformation on Alice's and Bob's encoding states and her ancilla given by Eq. (A1). We again assume that Alice and Bob do not know the details of |ϕ x C and |ϕ 
must hold for some non-negative real numbers C xy and C ′ xy . To begin our analysis, without loss of generality, we can assume in Eq. (A1) that |Γ xyz E = n γ xyzn |n E , in which |n E are a set of normalized orthogonal bases of Eve's states, and complex number γ xyzn = E n|Γ xyz E , satisfying n γ xyzn 2 = 1. Thus, we can give the density matrix for the case that Alice and Bob both select basis 0:
in which, P {|x } = |x x|. The aim of this EDP is to obtain perfect Bell states |φ +α AB = (|0 A |0 B + e i(αA+αB ) |1 A |1 B )/ √ 2. Accordingly, we can define the bit error rate e b and phase error rate e p under basis 0:
The task is to find a way to estimate an effective upper-bound of e p . Before proceeding, we remark that we just focus on the e p and final key bits rate for the basis 0 for simplicity, and thus we do not need to calculate the density matrix for the basis 1. But this basis 0's e p must be related to some probabilities of the basis 1, such as p(1|3, 2). Now we begin to detail how to obtain an upper bound of e p .
We substitute the relations (A2) into Eq. (A1) to obtain the following constraints:
in which x, y = {2, 3} and z = {0, 1}. Considering that |Γ xyz E can be spanned by a set of basis |n E and with Eq. (A6), we obtain
By observing the left-hand side of (A7) and with the help of triangle inequality and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have:
Therefore, we obtain
Furthermore, by the same way, we can obtain that
Combining constraints (A9) and (A10), we have
in which max C,C ′ f (C, C ′ ) means searching over all C 30 , C 31 , C ′ 20 and C ′ 21 satisfying possible constraints to find the maximum value of function f (C, C ′ ). Concretely, the f (C, C ′ ) is given by where min{a, b} yields the smaller one of real numbers a and b
Next we try to calculate above bounds by considering some constraints on it. Since we have known p (1|3, 0) 
where Re{x} returns the real part of a complex number x. For the ease of numerical computation, we rewrite above constraints as 
Now the task is to calculate ε in Eq.(A11) with constraints Eqs. (A14). Then e p can be calculated easily. Therefore, the secure-key rate is given by R = 1 − H(e b ) − H(e p ) = 1 − H(e b ) − H(min{ε + e b , 1/2}),
where H(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) is the Shannon's binary entropy function. Note that by employing the recently developed security proofs [48, 49] , our protocol can be secure against the most general attacks, although the attack analyzed here is collective attack.
